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Abstract 
Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency.  The practice of 
economics, however, distinguishes between rational and irrational beliefs.  There is therefore an 
interest in a theory of rational beliefs, and of the process by which beliefs are generated and 
justified.  We argue that the Bayesian approach is unsatisfactory for this purpose, for several 
reasons.  First, the Bayesian approach begins with a prior, and models only a very limited form of 
learning, namely, Bayesian updating.  Thus, it is inherently incapable of describing the formation 
of prior beliefs.  Second, there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for 
an individual to generate a Bayesian prior.  Third, this lack of information is even more acute 
when we address the beliefs that can be attributed to a society.  We hold that one needs to explore 
other approaches to the representation of information and of beliefs, which may be helpful in 
describing the formation of Bayesian as well as non-Bayesian beliefs. 
1. Rationality of Belief and Belief Formation 
One of the hallmarks of the modern era is the belief in rationality.  Many writers expected 
rationality to settle questions of faith, advance science, promote humanistic ideas, and 
bring peace on Earth.  In particular, philosophers did not shy away from arguing what is 
rational and what is not, and to take a stance regarding what Rational Man should do, 
believe, and aspire to. 
By contrast, economic theory in the 20th century took a much more modest, relativist, and 
even post-modern approach to rationality.  No longer was there a pretense to know what 
Rational Man should think or do.  Rather, rationality was reduced to various concepts of 
internal consistency.  For example, rational choice under certainty became synonymous 
                                                 
∗ These notes were written to organize our thinking on the topic.  We are aware of the fact that many of the 
arguments we raise here have been made by others.  At this point we do not provide an exhaustive 
reference list, and we make no claim to originality.  Our thinking on these issues was greatly influenced by 
discussions with many people.  In particular, we wish to thank Marion Ledwig, Stephen Morris, and Peter 
Wakker for comments and references. 
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with constrained maximization of a so-called utility function.  By and large, economic 
theory does not attempt to judge which utility functions make sense, reflect worthy goals, 
or lead to beneficial outcomes.  In essence, any utility function would suffice for an agent 
to be dubbed rational.  More precisely, utility functions might be required to satisfy some 
mathematical properties such as continuity, monotonicity, or quasi-concavity.  But these 
do not impose any substantive constraints on the subjective tastes of the economic agents 
involved.  Defined solely on the abstract mathematical structure, these properties may be 
viewed as restricting the form of preferences, but not their content.     
This minimalist requirement has two main justifications.  The first is the desire to avoid 
murky and potentially endless philosophical discussions regarding the “true” nature of 
rationality.  The second is that such a weak requirement does not exclude from the 
economic discussion more modes of behavior than are absolutely necessary.  As a result, 
the theory is rather general and rational choice theory has indeed been applied in a variety 
of contexts, for a wide variety of utility functions. 
A similarly minimalist definition was applied to the concept of belief.  In an attempt to 
avoid the question of what it is rational to believe, as well as not to rule out possibly 
strange beliefs, the theory has adopted a definition of rational beliefs that is also based on 
internal consistency alone.  Specifically, anyone who satisfies Savage’s (1954) axioms, 
and behaves as if they entertain a prior probability over a state space, will be considered a 
rational decision maker under uncertainty, and may be viewed as having rational beliefs. 
Such a relativist notion of rationality of belief is hardly intuitive.  If John were to believe 
that he is the current King of France, and to take decisions in accordance with this view, 
he would pass the rationality test.  Yet, it seems clearly irrational to entertain such beliefs 
despite evidence to the contrary.  Similarly, ardently believing that the sun will not rise 
tomorrow would hardly qualify as rational by any intuitive sense of the word.  In 
everyday parlance we make such distinctions between rational and irrational beliefs, and 
indeed, we confine people to institutions who hold beliefs of the sort that they are the 
King of France.  Yet, decision theory is silent on this issue.1 
As in the case of rationality of utility, reducing rationality of belief to internal consistency 
allows the theory of rational agents to apply rather widely.  But this generality may be 
costly.  First, when we refuse to address the question of what beliefs are rational, we may 
not notice certain regularities in the beliefs entertained by economic agents.  Second, by 
restricting attention to the coherence of beliefs, one evades the question of the generation 
                                                 
1 The notion of equilibrium in economics and in game theory may be viewed as an implicit definition of 
rational beliefs.  That is, rational beliefs are those that coincide with equilibrium behavior.  However, such 
a definition does not enlighten us about the process by which rational beliefs come into being. 
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of beliefs.  Indeed, economic theory offers no account of the belief formation process.  
Beliefs are supposedly derived from observed behavior, but there is no description of 
how beliefs arose in the first place. 
We believe that economic theory might benefit from a theory of belief formation, and, 
relatedly, a classification of beliefs according to their rationality.  A theory of belief 
formation may suggest a systematic way of predicting which beliefs agents might hold in 
various environments.  It may also delineate the scope of competing models for 
representation of beliefs.  Rationality of beliefs may serve as a refinement tool.2 
We argue that the Bayesian paradigm is lacking in that it precludes a theory of belief 
formation.  Further, we argue that the Bayesian paradigm cannot be viewed as a 
definition of rational beliefs.  Thus, both rationality of beliefs and belief formation 
suggest that we look beyond the Bayesian model for other types of representations of 
information and belief.   
For many economists, the concept of rational beliefs is equated with behavior that might 
be viewed as being governed by Bayesian beliefs.  We take issue with this point of view.  
First, we argue that rationality requires more than behavior that is consistent with a 
Bayesian prior.  Second, we find that sometimes such behavior is too high a standard for 
any reasonable definition of rationality.  Thus, we claim that behaving in accordance with 
the Bayesian model is neither sufficient nor necessary for rationality. 
We begin by stating more clearly what we refer to by the term “Bayesianism”.  We then 
proceed to argue that, from a cognitive point of view, Bayesianism has several limitations 
as a methodology for the representation of beliefs.  We next address the behavioral 
derivation of Bayesianism and explain why we find it neither a tenable theoretical 
argument for Bayesianism, nor a viable procedure for the elicitation of Bayesian beliefs.  
Finally, we conclude by arguing that Bayesianism is not a compelling definition of 
rationality. 
2. What is Bayesianism? 
The Bayesian paradigm is dominant, but precisely what does it mean to be Bayesian? 
There are at least three tenets that are sometimes understood by this term: 
The first tenet of Bayesianism:  Whenever a fact is not known, one should have 
probabilistic beliefs about it.  These beliefs may be given by a single probability measure 
defined over a state space in which every state resolves all relevant uncertainty.  The 
                                                 
2 In a sense, Cho-Kreps (1987) “intuitive criterion” and related belief-based refinements are among the few 
exceptions in which economic theory does dare to rule out certain beliefs on the grounds of irrationality.  
For a discussion of this literature, see Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1993).  
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notion of relevance in this statement hints that one may satisfy the first tenet with respect 
to certain problems but not necessarily with respect to others.  But the stronger form of 
the first tenet, which is quite popular in modern economic theory, ignores this 
qualification and assumes that one must be Bayesian with respect to anything one can 
conceive of. 
The second tenet of Bayesianism: In light of new information, the Bayesian prior should 
be updated to a posterior according to Bayes’s law. 
The third tenet of Bayesianism: When facing a decision problem, one should maximize 
expected utility with respect to one’s Bayesian beliefs (incorporating all information that 
one has gathered). 
In statistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, and related fields, Bayesianism 
typically means only the first two tenets.  In economics, by contrast, it is often coupled 
with the third tenet, which matches to the Bayesian approach a decision theory with clear 
behavioral implications.  Conversely, these behavioral implications can be the basis of an 
axiomatization of the Bayesian approach, coupled with expected utility maximization, as 
in Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937), and Savage (1954).  One may, however, also 
provide behavioral axiomatizations of the Bayesian approach with other decision 
theories, as in Machina and Schmeidler (1992).  Both types of axiomatization could also 
be used, in principle, for the elicitation of subjective probabilities based on behavior data. 
3. Limitations of Bayesianism 
We hold that the Bayesian approach has several limitations, because of which it cannot 
be the only methodology for the representation of beliefs.  In this sub-section we list three 
distinct (though somewhat related) reasons that the Bayesian paradigm may be found 
lacking for certain purposes. 
3.1 Formation of beliefs 
The Bayesian paradigm assumes a prior, and begins the process of learning with that 
prior.  As such, it does not deal with the process of belief formation, and does not address 
the question of the rationality of prior beliefs.  Bayesian learning means nothing more 
than the updating of a given prior.  It does not offer any theory, explanation, or insight 
into the process by which prior beliefs are formed.  Hence, we need to look beyond 
Bayesianism to cope with the questions of rationality of (prior) beliefs and of belief 
formation.  
Why would belief formation be of interest to economists?  Which beliefs agents entertain, 
in any given environment, is an empirical question.  A good economic theorist would 
have a good guess regarding the beliefs that should be attributed to agents in her model.  
This guess can be tested directly, whether rigorously or intuitively, or indirectly, by 
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contrasting the model’s predictions with observations.  In any case, what does economic 
theory stand to gain from a theory of belief formation? 
We believe that a formal, general theory of belief formation might benefit economic 
theory in several ways.  First, the process of abstraction and generalization may always 
suggest new insights.  If one understands why agents’ beliefs in a given, successful model 
are appropriate, one may use a theory of belief formation to find similarly appropriate 
beliefs in other models.  Second, it may be useful to have a theory that allows one to rank 
beliefs, attributed to agents within models, according to their justification, rationality, and 
degree of reasonability.  Finally, a theory of belief formation may help us relate beliefs 
off the equilibrium path to beliefs at equilibrium.  Currently, the theory offers neither 
explanation, nor systematic prediction of the way agents form beliefs once their original 
beliefs have been refuted.3  If we were to confront the question of how beliefs come into 
being in the first place, we might be able to predict how beliefs change as a result of 
observations that are inconsistent with original beliefs.  Thus one may attempt to apply a 
belief formation theory to the problem of backward induction play in complete 
information games.  We argue that one might predict what beliefs one might generate by 
deviating from the backward induction path, and that this prediction suggests that the 
deviation might not be profitable. 
3.2 Insufficient information 
All three tenets of Bayesianism have come under attack, especially as descriptive 
theories.  The most famous critique of Bayesian principles in economics is probably the 
descriptive failure of the third tenet, namely that people maximize expected utility when 
they are equipped with probabilistic beliefs.  This critique started with Allais’s famous 
example, and continued with the behavioral deviations from EUT documented by 
Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Much of the literature referred 
to as behavioral economics is based on this critique.4  The second tenet of Bayesianism, 
namely, that beliefs should be updated in accordance with Bayes’s law, is almost 
unassailable from a normative viewpoint.5  But it has also been shown to be descriptively 
lacking (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  Finally, the first tenet, namely, that one has 
probabilistic beliefs over anything uncertain, as been shown by Ellsberg (1961) to be an 
inaccurate description of people’s behavior. 
                                                 
3 Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel (1991) provide an axiomatic derivation of beliefs on as well as off 
equilibrium paths.  But their theory does not restrict off equilibrium beliefs in light of the prior beliefs, or 
the fact that these have been refuted. 
4 The term “behavioral” in “behavioral economics” may be misleading.  In this usage, it refers to the study 
of actual behavior, as opposed to normative theory (as in “behavioral decision theory”).  But “behavioral” 
should not be understood as focusing on behavior as opposed to cognition or to emotions.  Neo-classical 
economics is behavioral in that it considers only behavior as valid data.  Behavioral economics is less 
“behavioral” in this sense. 
5 Still, complexity considerations might render Bayesian updating a much more daunting task than it would 
seem in a basic probability class. 
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The first tenet is perhaps the weakest point of Bayesianism.  There are many problems 
involving uncertainty, where there is simply not enough information to sensibly generate 
probabilistic beliefs.  In these problems one may expect people to exhibit behavior that 
cannot be summarized by a single probability measure.  Moreover, when information is 
scarce, one may also reject the Bayesian approach on normative grounds, as did Knight 
(1921).  This normative failure is related to the limitation discussed above: the Bayesian 
paradigm does not offer a theory of (prior) belief generation.  It follows that, even if one 
were convinced that one would like to be Bayesian, the Bayesian approach does not 
provide the self-help tools that would help one become Bayesian if one isn’t.   
This normative failure stimulated the work of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989).  While the non-additive Choquet expected utility model (CEU, 
Schmeidler, 1989) and the multiple prior (maxmin) model (MMEU, Gilboa and 
Schmeidler, 1989) can be used to explain Ellsberg’s paradox (1961), they were not 
motivated by descriptive arguments, but rather, they were motivated by the argument that 
the Bayesian approach is too restrictive to faithfully represent the information one has. 
Consider the following example (Schmeidler, 1989).  You are faced with two coins, each 
of which is about to be tossed.  The first coin is yours.  You have tossed it, say, 1000 
times, and it has come up Heads 500 times, and Tails 500 times.  The second coin is 
presented to you by someone else, and you know nothing about it.  Let us refer to the first 
coin as the “known” one, and to the second as the “unknown” coin.  Asked to assign 
probabilities to known coin coming up Heads or Tails, it is only natural to estimate 50% 
for each, as these are the empirical frequencies gathered over a sizeable database.  When 
confronted with the same question regarding the unknown coin, however, no information 
is available, and relative frequencies do not offer any help in the estimation of 
probabilities.  But the first tenet of Bayesianism demands that both sides of the unknown 
coin be assigned probabilities, and that these probabilities add up to 1.  Symmetry 
suggests that these probabilities be 50% for each side.  Hence, you end up assigning the 
same probability estimates to the two sides of the unknown coin as you did for the two 
sides of the known coin.  Yet, the two 50%-50% distributions feel rather different.  In the 
case of the known coin, the distribution is based on a good deal of information that leads 
to a symmetric assessment.  In the case of the unknown coin, by contrast, the same 
estimates are based on the absence of information.  The Bayesian approach does not 
allow us to distinguish between symmetry that is based on information and symmetry that 
is based on lack thereof. 
One may embed this example in a decision problem, and predict choices as found by 
Ellsberg’s in his two-urn example.  But it is important that the example above does not 
involve decision making.  The point of departure of Schmeidler (1989) is not the 
descriptive failures of subjective EUT.  Rather, it is what one might call a sense of 
cognitive unease with the manner that the Bayesian paradigm deals with absence of 
information.  This cognitive unease points also to the normative failure of the Bayesian 
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approach in this example.  Even if one wished to become Bayesian, and even if one were 
willing to change one’s choices so as to conform to the Bayesian paradigm, one must 
ignore the amount of information that was used in the generation of prior beliefs. 
Ellsberg’s paradoxes and Schmeidler’s two-coin example are simple illustrations of the 
distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty” in Knight’s terms.  These examples can also 
be used to show that Savage’s axioms (specifically, P2) may fail as descriptive theories.  
But both examples are simple in a way that might be misleading.  These examples exhibit 
enough symmetries to suggest a natural prior via Laplace’s “principle of insufficient 
reason”.  If one honestly wished to become Bayesian, one could easily assign 50% 
probability to each color in Ellsberg’s two-urn experiment, and, similarly, 50% to each 
side of the unknown coin in Schmeidler’s example.  In both cases, the 50%-50% 
distribution is the only prior that respects the symmetry in the problem, and it is therefore 
a natural candidate for one’s beliefs.  Hence, considering these examples in isolation, one 
might conclude that, cognitive unease aside, it is fairly easy to become Bayesian even if 
one was not born Bayesian. 
This conclusion would be wrong.  Most decision problems encountered in real life do not 
possess sufficient symmetries for the principle of insufficient reason to uniquely identify 
a prior.  Consider, for example, the uncertainty about an impending war.  One cannot 
seriously suggest that the relative frequency of wars in the past may serve as a good 
estimate of the probability of a war at the present.  The world changes in such a way that 
the occurrence of wars cannot be viewed as repeated identical and independent 
repetitions of the same experiment.  Thus, the question of war is an example of 
uncertainty, rather than of risk.  Applying Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason 
would suggest that war has 50% probability.  But such a claim is preposterous.  We know 
enough about war and peace to rule out any possible symmetry between them.  Indeed, 
we can reason at length about the likelihood of war, to have sufficient reason to reject the 
principle of insufficient reason.6 
To conclude, a major failure of the Bayesian approach is that many real-life problems do 
not offer sufficient information to suggest a prior probability.  In a small fraction of these 
problems there are symmetries that suggest a unique prior based on the principle of 
insufficient reason.  But the vast majority of decision problems encountered by economic 
agents fall into a gray area, where there is too much information to arbitrarily adopt a 
symmetric prior, yet too little information to justifiably adopt a statistically-based prior. 
                                                 
6 A related difficulty with the principle of insufficient reason is that it depends on the partition of the states 
of the world.  In the absence of obvious symmetries, various partitions might be considered, leading to very 
different probability assessments. 
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3.3 The beliefs of society7 
Bayesian statistics and classical statistics have often been viewed as competing 
paradigms.  We suggest the view that these methodologies are designed to solve radically 
different problems.  This point of view illustrates another weakness of the Bayesian 
approach. 
Many would agree that Bayesian statistics is theoretically simpler and conceptually more 
coherent than is classical statistics.  Whereas classical statistics resorts to concepts such 
as “confidence” and “significance”, that are distinct from probability, Bayesian statistics 
only uses the concept of probability.  The Bayesian approach needs to distinguish neither 
between objective and subjective sources of uncertainty, nor between quantified and 
unquantified uncertainty.  Yet, in every day life, as well as in scientific contexts, classical 
statistics appears to be more popular.  The reason has to do with the subjectivity inherent 
in the Bayesian approach.  
Many textbooks illustrate the idea of hypothesis testing with a court case metaphor: the 
null hypothesis is that the defendant is innocent.  The alternative is that the defendant is 
guilty.  When we test the null hypothesis, we may find that we reject it, and the court then 
proclaims that the defendant was found guilty.  In other words, if no sufficient evidence 
of guilt is supplied, the null hypothesis is maintained as a default.  The court does not 
generally proclaim that the defendant is innocent, only that the evidence to the contrary 
leaves a reasonable doubt. 
This is a theoretically cumbersome structure.  The null hypothesis and the alternative are 
not treated symmetrically.  A hypothesis may be rejected but not validated.  The set of 
proclamations that may be attributed to the court fails to be closed under negation.  
Indeed, the logic of court decision and of hypothesis testing alike would have been much 
simpler if one were to adopt a Bayesian view.  In this case, one would start out with a 
prior probability regarding the defendant’s guilt, as well as on obtaining any piece of 
evidence conditional on guilt and on innocence, and, given the evidence actually 
presented, one would only have to update one’s prior.  If the posterior probability of guilt 
is high enough, one may proclaim the defendant guilty, and the same applies to 
innocence. 
But who is this “one”?  If the defendant’s mother is to be asked, she may start out with a 
zero prior probability of guilt, and no amount of evidence would convince her that her 
child is actually guilty.  On the other hand, the judge may have a prior according to which 
the defendant is almost surely guilty before even considering the evidence.  But most 
people would prefer to live in a society where their innocence (as defined by the legal 
system) does not depend on the judge’s prior.  In other words, the Bayesian approach is 
                                                 
7 This sub-section is based on Gilboa (1994). 
9 
inappropriate for this problem since it is inherently subjective, whereas the court system 
aspires to objectivity. 
There are situations where social institutions are called upon to make public claims.  
Whether society should make a certain claim will often be a topic of debate.  People 
would normally entertain different beliefs regarding the question at hand.  Moreover, 
people who have different goals may have an incentive to argue that they have different 
beliefs.  In light of these tensions, social institutions would tend to adopt methodologies 
that are akin to classical statistics in their quest for objectivity.  Such tools may be able to 
make certain claims, and may have to remain silent on many others. 
Individual decision makers are still free to draw on their intuition and subjective hunches, 
whatever the claims made or not made by society.  For example, assume that a man is 
accused on having murdered his wife.  Mary follows the case.  She feels uneasy about the 
defendant, and finds, in fact, that quite likely that he is the murderer.  She is willing to 
admit, however, that the evidence in the case is rather weak.  It is therefore perfectly 
coherent for Mary to wish that the defendant be found not guilty, according to objectively 
available evidence, and yet to decide that she would not date the defendant.  Similarly, 
for the question “Can society make a certain claim?” one would like to use tools of 
classical statistics, aiming at objectivity and shunning intuition.  However, for the 
question, “Do I believe in this claim?” one would prefer Bayesian tools, attempting to 
incorporate all intuition and subjective impressions, and result in a probability 
assessment. 
Another domain in which the Bayesian approach is precluded because of its subjectivity 
is science.  Consider a hypothetical case of Dr. Strangelove who develops a new 
medication for AIDS.  If Dr. Strangelove were to publish his Bayesian analysis of his 
medication, he could point out that, given his prior beliefs and the evidence, his posterior 
belief that his drug is safe and effective is very high.  But this posterior may be mostly 
due to a prior that practically assumes this conclusion.  Instead, Dr. Strangelove is asked 
to put his conclusions to the tests of classical statistics, and to show that, based on 
objective measure, his new medication is indeed safe and effective. 
As in the case of Mary and her potential date, one may distinguish between social 
statements and individual decision making.  Assume, for instance, that a respectable drug 
company intends to market Dr. Strangelove’s medication.  The company has applied to 
the FDA for approval of the new medication.  This approval process is pending.  That is, 
society has not yet endorsed the claims of the scientist and the company.  Next consider 
John who suffers from AIDS.  John fears that he is dying and he wishes to take the new 
medication.  He reasons that the company would not risk its reputation and would not 
submit the medication for approval unless it was truly helpful.  It is therefore reasonable 
for John to take the medication if it is available, even though most people, perhaps John 
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included, would prefer the FDA to complete its testing and approve the new medication 
independently of the reputation of the company producing it. 
Observe that in this discussion we offer a possible view of what Bayesian and classical 
statistics attempt to achieve, not necessarily what they do achieve.  Classical statistics 
attempts to be objective, but it is well known that it can be manipulated in various ways.  
More generally, many authors question the possibility, and indeed the very notion of 
objective science.  On the other hand, Bayesian statistics attempts to capture intuition, but 
it may not always succeed in this goal.  Indeed, the examples discussed in the previous 
sub-section suggest that not all intuition can indeed be captured in a Bayesian model.  
Our claim is that classical statistics may be viewed as aspiring to objectivity, whereas 
Bayesian statistics aspires to a unified treatment of the subjective and the objective.   
To conclude, there is another reason to be interested in non-Bayesian paradigms of 
information and belief representation.  Even if each individual has enough information 
for the generation of a Bayesian prior, individuals often differ in their beliefs.  
Recognizing this fact, society usually will choose to endorse statements only according to 
a well-defined protocol, such as those offered by classical statistics.  Society will choose 
to remain silent on many issues.  Thus, the set of statements that society will endorse 
typically does not suffice for a generation of a prior. 
4. Behavioral derivations of Bayesianism 
The limitations of the Bayesian approach mentioned above are cognitive in spirit: they 
deal with the degree to which a mathematical model captures our intuition when 
reasoning about uncertainty.  The standard approach in economics, however, would find 
these cognitive limitations hardly relevant.  Rather, following the revealed preference 
paradigm, most economists would suggest that decisions are eventually being made, and 
if these decisions satisfy (say) Savage’s axioms, then expected utility maximization with 
respect to a Bayesian prior is an inevitable conclusion.  Further, one’s subjective 
probability may even be elicited from one’s observed choices.  Finally, Savage’s axioms 
appear very compelling.  It therefore appears that any deviation from subjective EU 
maximization violates a certain canon of rationality.   
We devote this sub-section to a criticism of this argument.  We first draw a distinction 
between two possible interpretations of a preference relation: raw preferences and 
reasoned choice.  We then address each interpretation and argue that, with this 
interpretation in mind, one cannot derive the Bayesian approach from Savage’s axioms.  
That is, it is misleading to argue that the axioms necessitate the existence of a prior, and 
eliciting the prior from behavior is not a viable alternative.  Finally, we conclude by 
arguing that Savage’s axioms are neither sufficient nor necessary for rationality. 
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4.1 Raw preferences and reasoned choice 
We need to address both the descriptive and the normative interpretation of Savage’s 
axioms.8  But it may be more efficient to split the discussion along slightly different lines.  
Consider a binary relation representing preferences, or choices, as in Savage’s theory.  
This relation can be interpreted in (at least) two ways.  First, it might reflect raw 
preferences, namely, the decision maker’s almost-instinctive tendency to prefer one 
alternative over another.  Second, the same binary relation might model reasoned choice, 
namely, choice that was arrived at by a process of reasoning.  Roughly, the decision 
maker exhibits raw preferences if she first acts, then observes her own act and stops to 
think about it.  The decision maker is involved in reasoned choice if she first thinks, then 
decides how to act. 
The process of reasoning may be modeled by logic.  A reason to, say, prefer alternative f 
over g is akin to a proof, where from certain assumptions one derives the conclusion that 
f should be chosen over g.  With different sets of assumptions one may generate reasons 
for and, simultaneously, against certain choices. 
A descriptive interpretation of preferences in Savage’s model may be either one of raw 
preferences or of reasoned choice.  When describing reality, one has to cope with the fact 
that in certain decision problems the decision maker acts first, and thinks later (if at all), 
whereas in others she may reason her way to a decision.  By contrast, a normative 
interpretation of Savage’s theory deals with reasoned choice: if one attempts to convince 
a decision maker to change their decision, they normally provide reasons to do so. 
The concept of “reasoned choice” may also be extended to beliefs.  One might 
distinguish among three levels of rationality of beliefs.  The lowest degree of rationality 
is attributed to beliefs that are contrary to evidence, as in the case of a person who insists 
that he is the King of France.  The highest degree of rationality would be reserved to 
belief that is justifiable by evidence, or to reasoned belief.  In between one may find 
beliefs that are neither justified not contradicted by evidence.9 
We started by observing that the commonly accepted Bayesian approach reduces 
rationality to internal consistency, allowing beliefs that are contrary to evidence.  The 
Bayesian approach, however, does not necessitate such plainly irrational beliefs.  By 
contrast, the Bayesian approach does require that beliefs be stated even in the absence of 
evidence.  Thus, it insists on specification of beliefs beyond reasoned belief. 
                                                 
8 The same discussion can be conducted in the context of any other behavioral axiomatization of 
Bayesianism.  We choose to refer to Savage as his is, justifiably, the most well-known axiomatization. 
9 Similarly, rationality might be applied to absence of beliefs.  For instance, if John insists that he does not 
believe that the Earth is flat, nor that it is round, this agnosticism may be viewed as irrational. 
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4.2 Derivation of Bayesianism from raw preferences  
We argued that in many problems there is insufficient information for the generation of a 
(unique) prior probability measure.  One might wonder whether raw preferences do not 
provide this information indirectly.  After all, as long as Savage’s axioms are satisfied, 
one may elicit from preferences a unique probability measure.  It would therefore appear 
that in order to have a prior all one needs to know is one’s own preferences.  There are 
several related reasons for which we find this conclusion unwarranted. 
Unreasoned preferences need not satisfy Savage’s axioms 
One may argue that reasoned preferences should adopt EUT as a normative theory, and 
attempt to satisfy its axioms.  We comment on the appropriateness of the axioms for 
reasoned choice below.  By contrast, raw preferences need not satisfy Savage’s axioms.  
Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that in certain situations EUT is consistently being 
violated by many decision makers.  Hence, using raw preferences as the starting point 
from which beliefs would emerge is a dubious endeavor. 
Beliefs precede choices 
Following logical positivism, economic theory in the 20th century opted for a behavioral 
approach, according to which intentional concepts such as “utility” and “belief” were 
considered theoretical constructs that need to be derived from observations.  The revealed 
preference paradigm further holds that legitimate observations for economics can only be 
observed choice behavior, ruling out other sources of information such as introspection 
and subjective reports of preferences, likelihood judgments, and the like.  The derivations 
of subjective EUT by Ramsey, de Finetti, and Savage fit this approach.10 
The behavioral derivations of utility and of belief can be interpreted in several ways, 
depending on the degree of awareness of the decision maker.  A maximalist interpretation 
would hold that the decision maker has direct access to a utility function and to a 
probability measure, and that the theory actually describes the decision making process.  
A minimalist interpretation, by contrast, would take no stance on the question of the 
decision maker’s awareness.  Rather, it would suggest that, for an outside observer, it 
suffices that a decision maker who satisfies a certain set of axioms can be described as if 
she were following a certain decision rule.  Another possible interpretation is that the 
decision maker does not have direct access to her utility function and probability 
measure, but that she does have access to her own preferences, and that she can 
consequently derive her utility and probability from her choices, as could an external 
observer.  It is this interpretation that we discuss here.   
                                                 
10 De Finetti and Savage also discussed qualitative probabilities, that may be viewed as observable “at least 
as likely as” judgments.  Thus, their works can also be interpreted as deriving probabilities based on 
subjective reports, rather than on actually observable choice. 
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Using an axiomatization to learn something about oneself is often rather plausible.  
Consider the case of a utility function.  Consumers are generally expected to satisfy the 
axioms of completeness and transitivity without being aware of their own utility function.  
They are not even supposed to be aware of their preferences in any cognitive sense.  
Rather, it suffices that they know observed choice.  Indeed, a consumer may find that she 
doesn’t like a certain brand of juice by discovering that she has bought it but never got to 
consume it.  In this sense, “preference needs no inference”: choices are being made by 
consumers without them having to go through complicated mental procedures such as 
maximization of utility functions. 
In certain restricted examples, a similar interpretation might hold also for beliefs.  A 
driver who buckles up only when she drives on a highway might infer that she assigns a 
higher probability to the event of a deadly accident when driving on the highway as 
compared to city driving.  Such a choice could perhaps be made without an explicit 
decision making process that estimates probabilities. 
But in many decision situations, this interpretation is hardly valid.  To consider an 
extreme example, assume that Mary is faced with the uncertainty about the truth of a 
mathematical conjecture.  If Mary were Bayesian, she would have an exact probability p 
that the conjecture is true.  Since she may not have enough information to generate such a 
prior, the present approach suggests that Mary introspect and figure out her preferences 
for various bets on the correctness of this conjecture.  Thus, Mary is expected to ask 
herself, say, if she prefers to bet $100 on the correctness or on the falsehood of the 
conjecture.  But Mary will soon find out that she does not have the foggiest idea about 
her own preferences in this case.  Her only way to decide what her preferences are is to 
start thinking whether the mathematical conjecture is likely to be true.   
To consider a more relevant example, assume now that Bob is asked what the probability 
of a nuclear war in Asia is in the next five years.  Bob does not have enough statistical 
evidence to generate a prior based on past frequencies.  If he were to adopt the approach 
suggested here, he should be asking himself whether he prefers to get an outcome x if 
such a war erupts, and an outcome y otherwise, to, say, a sure outcome z.  Again, Bob 
cannot be expected to have well-defined accessible preferences over such choices.  
Rather, he would have to stop and ponder.  Only after he assesses the probability of war 
can he meaningfully answer these preference questions. 
One might argue that Bob’s decisions implicitly define his beliefs even if Bob himself is 
not aware of these beliefs.  For example, Bob’s trading in the stock market (or lack 
thereof) indirectly reveals his preferences over bets involving such a war.  Indeed, if Bob 
did bother to think about the problem and if he came up with a prior probability, the latter 
may be reflected in his investment choices.  But if Bob has not made a conscious 
estimation of probabilities, there is no reason to expect his choices to satisfy Savage’s 
axioms.  
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To conclude, in situations where there is not sufficient information to generate a prior, we 
may not assume that decision makers know all their relevant preferences.  In fact, there 
are many such situations in which only reasoned choice is possible, and raw preferences 
simply do not exist. 
The unobservability of preferences 
The notion of “observability”, in decision and in economic theory alike, allows some 
freedom of interpretation.  Most theories in economics and in related disciplines have 
paradigmatic applications, which leave little room for various interpretations.  For 
example, it is convenient to think of Savage’s axioms in the context of bets on a color of 
a ball drawn at random from an urn.  In this context, the states of the world are clearly 
defined by the balls in the urn.  Choices made contingent on the color of the ball drawn 
can be thought of as direct observations of a preference relation in a Savage-type model.  
But most economic applications of subjective EUT do not have such a clearly defined 
state space.  Worse still, it is often not clear the state space the decision maker has in 
mind. 
Assume that Mary is considering quitting her job and taking another job offer.  She 
presumably considers her potential promotion in the new firm.  This decision problem 
involves uncertainty and can be couched in a Savage-type model.  A state of the world in 
such a model should specify the values of all variables that Mary deems relevant.  For 
instance, a state should be informative enough to determine Mary’s salary in a year’s 
time.  Mary might also consider the expertise she might acquire on the job, the people she 
is likely to work with, the economic stability of her employer, her own job security, and a 
number of other variables, for any time horizon she might plan for.  Moreover, the set of 
states of the world should also allow all possible causal relationships between Mary’s 
actions and these variables.  For example, Mary should take into account that with one 
employer her promotion is practically guaranteed, while with another it depends on her 
effort level.  The nature of the causal relationship between effort and promotion is also 
subject to uncertainty, and should therefore also be specified by each state of the world. 
These considerations give rise to two difficulties.  First, the state space becomes large and 
complicated, and with it – the set of conceivable acts defined on this state space in 
Savage’s mode.  Second, it is not at all clear which of the above uncertainties are taken 
into account by Mary.  We may observe Mary’s decision regarding the new job offer, but 
not the states of the world that she entertains in her mind.  It follows that, having 
observed Mary’s choice, we may construct many different Savage-type models in which 
her choice is modeled as a preference between two acts.  But in each such model there 
will be many other pairs of acts, the choice between which was not observed.  Clearly, if 
the states of the world themselves are unobservable, one cannot hope to observe a 
complete binary relation between all the acts defined on these states. 
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A possible solution to the second problem would be to define an exhaustive state space, 
within which one may embed every conceivable state space that the decision maker has 
in mind.  But such a solution aggravates the first problem.  In fact, it renders most 
pairwise choices inherently unobservable.  To see this, imagine that one defines the set of 
outcomes to include all conceivable consequences, over any time horizon.  One then 
proceeds to define states as all possible functions from acts to outcomes.  This would 
result in an exhaustive, canonical state space.  Next, one must define all the conceivable 
acts (Savage, 1954): all possible functions from states to outcomes.  Over this set of 
conceivable outcomes one assumes that a complete binary relation is observable, and that 
the observed choices would satisfy Savage’s axioms.  But such a relation cannot be 
observable even in principle.  In this states are functions from actual acts to outcomes, 
and conceivable acts are functions from these states to the same set of outcomes.  Thus 
the set of conceivable acts is by two orders of magnitudes larger than the set of acts that 
are actually available in the problem.  This implies that the vast majority of the binary 
choices assumed in Savage’s model are not observable, even in principle.  
Savage’s theory has a clear observable meaning in experiments involving simple set-ups 
such as balls drawn out of urns.  But in many economic applications of EUT the state 
space is not directly observable, and hence Savage’s behavioral axioms do not have a 
clear observable meaning.  In particular, observing actual behavior does not contain 
enough information for the elicitation of a prior over the state space.11 
4.3 Derivation of Bayesianism from reasoned choice  
Reasoned choice need not be complete 
The completeness axiom is typically justified by necessity: one must make a decision, 
and whatever one chooses will be viewed as the preferred act.  This argument seems to 
apply to observed preferences.12  Indeed, if one defines preference by observations, the 
completeness axiom is almost tautological.13  But when we consider reasoned choice, 
there does not seem to be a compelling argument for completeness. 
To see this point more clearly, consider first the case of transitivity.  If there is a reason to 
prefer f to g, and if there is a reason to prefer g to h, then these two reasons may be 
combined to provide a reason to prefer f to h.  The transitivity axiom may actually be 
                                                 
11 In the construction mentioned above it is also not clear whether Savage’s axioms are satisfied by actual 
decision makers, since we can never observe more than a fraction of the pairwise choices referred to by the 
axioms.  
12 As mentioned above, even with observed preferences this argument is questionable.  In many 
applications of Savage’s theorem one may not assume that all acts are possible candidates for observable 
choice. 
13 Completeness is not quite a tautology because it is often taken to mean that preferences within each pair 
of acts will be the same in repeated experiments of the same decision problem.  However, as opposed to the 
other axioms, completeness cannot be refuted by single observations of distinct binary choices. 
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viewed as a reasoning axiom, providing an argument, or a justification for a certain 
preference.  It can similarly be used to infer certain preferences from others.  Similarly, 
Savage’s axioms P2, P3, and P4 can be viewed as templates for reasoning that a certain 
act should be preferred to another.14  The same cannot be said of the completeness axiom.  
The completeness axioms states that (reasoned) choice should be defined between any 
two acts f and g, but it provides no help in finding reasons to prefer f to g or vice versa. 
If one views Savage’s axioms as conditions on raw preferences, the completeness axiom 
may be mentioned as a half-axiom barely worth mentioning.  Completeness in this set-up 
is one out of two requirements in P1, and it barely calls for elaboration.  But if the Savage 
axioms are viewed as conditions for reasoned choice, the completeness axiom plays an 
altogether different role: it is contrasted with all the rest.  The completeness axiom 
defines the question, namely, what are the reasoned preferences between pairs of acts, 
and all the rest are part of the answer, that is, potential reasons that may come to bear in 
determining preferences between particular pairs of acts. 
Computational complexity 
When decision problems do not present themselves to the decision maker with a clearly 
defined state space, the generation of all relevant states involves insurmountable 
computational difficulties.  For example, assume that we are given m variables that may 
serve as predictors for another variable.  We prefer to have a subset of the predictors that 
yields a good fit with relatively few variables.  For each subset of the predictors there is a 
state of the world in which this subset is the most appropriate set of predictors, say, the 
set that obtains the highest adjusted R2.  Thus, there are exponentially many states of the 
world, relative to the size of the database.  It is therefore far from trivial to list all these 
states, let alone the entire decision matrix.  In Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite, and 
Schmeidler (2003) we show that it is NP-Hard to determine whether, for a given 
database, and a given k, there are k predictors that obtain a pre-specified level of R2. 
To take another example, consider contract theory.  It is typically assumed that a contract 
specifies outcomes given states of the world.  But the language in which contracts are 
stated involves clauses and conditional statements, rather than specific states.  While it is 
possible to define a state of the world as a truth table, assigning truth value to each 
relevant proposition, the number of states is exponential in the size of the contract.  
Indeed, in Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2003) we show that, given a contract in 
its clause form, it is NP-Hard to determine the most basic questions about it, such as 
whether it is complete, consistent, or whether it has a positive expected value for a given 
party (even if probabilities of events are given). 
                                                 
14 To some degree, continuity axioms such as P7 and even P6 can also be viewed as reasoning axioms.  But 
for the purposes of the present discussion it is best to focus on the axioms that are more fundamental from a 
conceptual viewpoint.  
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These considerations suggest that the Savage axioms may be a too demanding standard of 
rationality.  A normative theory may not be useful if it requires agents to solve NP-Hard 
problems.  We should not assume that economic agents could solve problems that 
computer scientists cannot solve. 
Other difficulties 
The elicitation of beliefs from reasoned choice encounters two additional problems that 
were discussed also for raw preferences.  First, the observability problem means, for 
reasoned choice, that defining one’s preference relations requires a large degree of 
hypothetical reasoning.  Second, reasoned choice might contradict other axioms of 
Savage, beyond the completeness axiom.  While these axioms are themselves reasons for 
a particular preference, they may generate conflicting preferences.  The only algorithm 
that would guarantee a resolution of these conflicts in a way that satisfies the axioms 
would be to select a probability and a utility function and to make decision in accordance 
with EUT.  This, however, brings us back to the task of specifying a prior directly, rather 
than deriving it from choices. 
4.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, we hold that Savage’s axioms cannot in general serve as a standard of 
rationality.  We argued above that the axioms are too strong, namely, that they are not 
necessary conditions for rationality to hold.  In Section I we claimed that, in other ways, 
Savage’s axioms are too weak and that they do not constitute a sufficient condition for 
rationality.  This claim deserves elaboration. 
We do not believe that criteria of internal consistency can serve as a satisfactory 
definition of rationality.  Assume that John makes decisions in a way that violates some 
of Savage’s axioms.  His inconsistent choices are being presented to him, together with 
the result, namely, that he has failed the rationality test.  Assume further that John is 
eager to obtain the highly coveted title, “a rational decision maker”.  He asks a decision 
theorist how he can do this.  The theorist replies, “Oh, that’s easy.  You just pick a prior 
probability and a utility function, and from now on all you do is maximize the 
expectation of this utility with respect to this prior.  I can help you with the calculations if 
you wish.  If you still find this hard, however, let me mention that this is the only way in 
which you can pass Savage’s test.  There is a theorem to this effect.  So being rational is 
precisely as easy (and as hard) as picking a utility-probability pair and maximizing the 
integral.” 
Assume that John accepts the advice, and arbitrarily selects a utility function and a 
probability measure.  He then dutifully maximizes expected utility.  Next time he is tested 
for rationality, his preferences are shown to satisfy Savage’s axioms.  John gets to be 
accredited as “rational decision maker under uncertainty”.   
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Would we endorse this accreditation?  Probably not automatically.  It is after all possible 
that John is taking decisions in accordance with the belief that he is the King of France.  
There is, however, plenty of evidence that he is not.  We would typically expect a rational 
decision maker to base her beliefs on some evidence, or at least to make sure that these 
beliefs do not contradict overwhelming evidence.  It follows that Savage’s consistency 
axioms, as well as any other set of axioms that confine themselves to internal 
consistency, are insufficient for a definition of rationality.  Rather, an axiomatic approach 
to rational beliefs would require, inter alia, a treatment of the relationship between beliefs 
and evidence. 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) offer a model in which likelihood rankings are 
parameterized by a database of cases.  But even this model says nothing about the 
relationship between a past case and future predictions, and allows counter-intuitive 
predictions (as long as they are aggregated in accordance with a set of axioms).  An 
intuitive definition of rational beliefs requires additional structure that would allow one to 
state which specific predictions are more likely than others, given specific data.  Such 
statements are bound to be controversial, and they will be open to criticism along the 
lines of Goodman’s “grue-bleen” paradox.15  One should expect that the truthfulness of 
such statements will not be judged based on a-priori reasoning alone, but also based on 
empirical investigations. 
Economic theory seems to be living in interesting times.  Over several decades, 
economics incorporated decision making under uncertainty into the full range of 
economic problems.  Overwhelmingly, the specific model of decision making has been 
Savage’s model.  While this enterprise has led to many important insights, many 
economists have become increasingly aware of the limitations of this model and engaged 
in dialogues with disciplines such as psychology and computer science in search for 
alternatives or augmentations to the Savage model to address these limitations.  It is too 
early to predict which of the methodologies offered by these fellow disciplines will enter 
the canon of economic thought.  But there is reason to hope that this search will provide 
economic theory with a notion of belief and a theory of decision making that will be 
better justified and hence more rational than the idealization offered by the Bayesian 
approach. 
                                                 
15 The “grue-bleen” paradox shows that certain predicates are natural, while others are not, in a way that 
can hardly be justified based solely on logical or a-priori reasoning.  In particular, “green” and “blue” are 
natural predicates.  By contrast “grue”, which means “green until 2010 and blue thereafter”, and “bleen”, 
which means “blue until 2010 and green thereafter”, are not.  The choice of “natural” predicates also has 
implications to the choice of “natural” theories and to the intuitive selection of methods of induction.  All 
scientific predictions are based on implicit assumptions regarding the correct choice or predicates, and a 
theory of belief formation should probably not aspire to be free of these assumptions. 
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